Worked cases

Worked case: Separator high pressure: close inlet shutdown valve

Classic overpressure trip on a production separator: 2oo3 pressure transmitters, safety PLC, one inlet shutdown valve. With a perfect proof test it meets SIL 2; with the realistic 80 % valve test coverage it does not. That gap is why coverage matters.

3 min read · First Out AI knowledge library

Example drawing: Separator high pressure: close inlet shutdown valve
Example drawing: Separator high pressure: close inlet shutdown valve. Fictional unit and tags, simplified symbols.

The function

Prevents overpressure and loss of containment of the HP separator if the upstream pressure control fails open or the gas outlet is blocked. The relief valve is not sized for the full gas blow-by case, so the SIF is the main barrier.

Safe state: Inlet shutdown valve closed and the separator isolated from the high-pressure source. Gas outlet valve remains open to the flare header.

Process safety time: 90 s from the trip point to the design pressure (dynamic simulation, worst case). Required response: ≤ 30 s including valve stroke. Setpoint: PAHH at 92 % of design pressure, 2oo3 voting; PAH alarm in the control system at 85 %.

Where the target comes from (LOPA)

Upstream pressure control valve fails open (BPCS loop failure) → HP separator overpressure → loss of containment, flammable gas release, ignition.

ItemValueNote
Initiating event frequency0.1 per yearBPCS control loop failure, company LOPA table (illustrative)
Probability of ignition0.3Company ignition probability table (illustrative)
Probability of personnel in the affected area0.4Area occupancy study (illustrative)
Relief valve PSV-1101 (sized for blocked outlet, not full blow-by)0.01Independent of the initiating cause; tested every 4 years
BPCS high pressure alarm and operator response1Not credited: same BPCS as the initiating cause
Tolerable frequency1e-6 per yearCompany tolerable frequency for multiple fatalities (illustrative)

Mitigated event frequency without the SIF: 1.2 × 10⁻⁴ per year. Required risk reduction factor: 120. Required PFDavg: 8.3 × 10⁻³. Target: SIL 2.

Inputs (illustrative values)

GroupVotingλDU /hλDD /hλSU /hβT1PTCPartial strokeTypeSC
Pressure transmitters PT-1101A/B/C2oo31e-75e-75e-85 %1 yr95 %–BSC 3
Safety PLC1oo15e-91e-600 %10 yr99 %–BSC 3
Inlet SDV XV-1101 with solenoid1oo19e-701.6e-60 %1 yr80 %–ASC 3

Mission time 20 years, low demand (PFDavg). Failure rates are illustrative values written for First Out AI, not taken from any certificate or database.

Result (First Out AI engine v0.3.0)

MeasureValue
PFDavg0.019
SIL by probability1
SIL by IEC 61511 fault tolerance2
Systematic capabilitySC 3
Achieved SIL1 (does not meet SIL 2)
Required PFDavg8.3e-3 (not met)
Mean time to spurious trip20.3 years
GroupVotingPFDavgShareHFT / requiredSFF
Pressure transmitters PT-1101A/B/C2oo34.5 × 10⁻⁵0 %1 / 085 %
Safety PLC1oo12.3 × 10⁻⁴1 %1 / 0100 %
Inlet SDV XV-1101 with solenoid1oo10.01999 %0 / 064 %

Engineer's reading

  • Inlet SDV XV-1101 with solenoid carries 99 % of the PFDavg, so improvements there matter most.
  • With a perfect proof test (the Free plan assumption) the PFDavg would be 4.2 × 10⁻³; the difference to 0.019 is the effect of the realistic proof test coverage.
  • The function does not meet its target. Typical options: improve the proof test coverage of Inlet SDV XV-1101 with solenoid, shorten its test interval, add partial stroke testing, or add redundancy with separate solenoids and air supplies; recalculate each option in First Out AI.

Open this example in First Out AI: SIL verification → Examples → "Separator high pressure: close inlet shutdown valve".

Written for First Out AI as engineering guidance. It supports engineering work and does not replace it; check every value against your standards, certificates and company rules with a competent functional safety engineer.