From hazard to verified safety instrumented function

SIL determination, SIL verification and the documents that carry them through the IEC 61511 lifecycle. Each package states what you get, what I need from you and what it costs.

Layers of protection around a process hazard, with the safety instrumented function highlighted Mitigation: dike, emergency response Relief: PSV to flare Alarm and operator response Safety instrumented function, SIL 2, risk reduction 100 or more Basic process control Process hazard overpressure of V-01
Drawing FS-01Layers of protection around a process hazardIllustrative, not a client design

Service packages

  • SIL Determination & LOPA

    Target SIL for each safety instrumented function, set with a calibrated risk matrix, a risk graph or layer of protection analysis. Independent protection layers are tested against their criteria, not assumed.

    Deliverables

    • SIL determination report
    • LOPA worksheets per scenario
    • Independent protection layer register
    • Assumptions and open-items log

    from $3,900Two remote sessions, up to 15 scenarios, report included

    See an example deliverable
    LOPA worksheet, scenario S-03 (excerpt)Tank overfill
    ItemValueBasis
    Initiating event: level control fails, inlet valve stays open0.1 per yearBPCS loop failure frequency from your site data
    Enabling condition: tank receiving product0.5Fraction of the year, from operating records
    IPL 1: high level alarm and operator responsePFD 0.1Alarm independent of the failed loop; 20 min response < 45 min available
    Dike around the tankNot creditedLimits the spill but does not prevent the fire consequence
    Mitigated event frequency5 × 10⁻³ per year0.1 × 0.5 × 0.1
    Tolerable frequency1 × 10⁻⁵ per yearYour company risk criteria
    Required risk reduction from the SIFRRF 500 → SIL 2Required PFDavg 2 × 10⁻³
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.
  • SIL Verification Study

    Each function checked against its target on all three requirements: average probability of failure on demand (or PFH), hardware fault tolerance, and systematic capability. Spurious trip rate is reported alongside.

    Deliverables

    • Verification report per function
    • Calculation files you can re-run
    • Proof test interval and coverage recommendations
    • Register of failure-rate sources

    from $260 per functionComplex functions $420. Minimum five functions.

    See an example deliverable
    Verification summary, SIF-12 high-high pressureTarget SIL 2, required PFDavg 2 × 10⁻³
    SubsystemArchitecturePFDavgShareHFT achieved / required
    Pressure transmitters2oo33.1 × 10⁻⁵3 %1 / 0
    Safety PLC1oo1, internal 1oo2D9.0 × 10⁻⁶1 %1 / 0
    Shutdown valve with solenoid1oo11.16 × 10⁻³96 %0 / 0
    FunctionSeries1.2 × 10⁻³SIL 2 bandSystematic capability SC 3 ≥ 2
    VerdictSIL 2 achievedMeets 2 × 10⁻³Spurious trip MTTFS 9.4 years
    RecommendationValve dominatesPartial stroke test every 3 monthsRecalculate after test procedure is agreed
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.
  • Safety Requirements Specification

    An SRS for each function: trip setpoints, response time against process safety time, voting, bypass and reset requirements, proof test requirements and spurious trip limits.

    Deliverables

    • SRS document, structured to IEC 61511
    • Traceability from hazard to function
    • List of open data and decisions

    from $180 per functionMinimum $1,500

    See an example deliverable
    SRS extract, SIF-12Rev A, for review
    RequirementSpecification
    Hazard and sourceSeparator overpressure; HAZOP node 3 "more pressure"; LOPA scenario S-03
    Sensors and votingPT-12A/B/C, 2oo3; trip at 18.0 barg (design pressure 20 barg)
    Final elementsXV-12 closes; feed pump P-12 stops
    Safe stateInlet isolated; held until manual reset
    Response time≤ 10 s from sensor to valve closed; process safety time 30 s
    BypassMaintenance override per channel, 8 h limit, alarm in the control room
    ResetManual, local, after the cause is cleared
    Proof testEvery 12 months; coverage ≥ 90 % including valve stroke and seat leakage
    Spurious tripsMean time to spurious trip ≥ 5 years
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.
  • Proof Test Planning

    Proof test intervals that match the verification, coverage you can defend, and step-by-step procedures a technician can follow and sign.

    Deliverables

    • Proof test procedures with record sheets
    • Interval justification
    • Test coverage register

    from $220 per procedureOne procedure per device type and function

    See an example deliverable
    Proof test procedure PT-SIF-12 (excerpt)Coverage claimed 90 %
    StepActionAcceptance
    1Permit, bypass PT-12A only; inform the control roomBypass alarm shown; other channels in service
    2Apply pressure to PT-12A with a calibrated test pumpTrip at 18.0 ± 0.2 barg; as-found recorded
    3Repeat for PT-12B and PT-12COne channel in trip gives alarm only; two give trip (2oo3)
    4Full stroke XV-12 closed from the SISClosed in ≤ 8 s; limit switch confirmed in SIS and DCS
    5Seat leakage test across XV-12Within the leakage class in the SRS
    6Remove bypasses, record as-left stateNo active bypass; record signed by tester and supervisor
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.
  • HAZOP Facilitation & Reporting

    Remote HAZOP sessions with node definition, deviation analysis and a recommendations register that feeds SIL determination.

    Deliverables

    • HAZOP worksheets
    • HAZOP report
    • Action register with owners

    from $2,900First day including preparation and report; $1,600 per additional day

    See an example deliverable
    HAZOP worksheet, node 3: separator (excerpt)Session 2
    DeviationCauseConsequenceSafeguardsAction
    More pressureGas outlet valve closed in errorOverpressure, loss of containmentPIC-11, high pressure alarm, PSV-13A-07: candidate SIF, take to LOPA
    Less levelLCV-14 fails openGas blow-by to the downstream tankLow level alarmA-08: check tank vent capacity for blow-by
    Reverse flowPump P-12 stops with discharge openBackflow into the feed lineCheck valveA-09: confirm check valve is on the test plan
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.
  • Cause & Effect Matrix

    A cause and effect matrix built from P&IDs and the shutdown philosophy, with each safety function separated out and traceable to its hazard.

    Deliverables

    • Cause & effect matrix (Excel)
    • Safety instrumented function list

    from $180 per functionMinimum $1,200; from the P&IDs and shutdown philosophy

    See an example deliverable
    Cause & effect matrix, unit 100 (excerpt)Rev B
    CauseXV-12 closeP-12 stopXV-15 closeAlarm
    PT-12A/B/C high-high (2oo3), SIF-12XXX
    LT-14 low-low (1oo2), SIF-14XXX
    Confirmed fire in area 100 (2ooN)XXXX
    ESD push button, control roomXXXX
    Illustrative excerpt written for this site; tags and values are invented, not client data.

Prices in US dollars, excluding any taxes that apply to your organisation.

Sample work package: SIL verification of ten functions

Three weeks from complete inputs to final report, with one review round.

  1. Week 0: inputs

    You send the function list, P&IDs, cause & effect, target SILs and device data sheets or certificates.

  2. Week 1: gap list

    Missing data and questionable assumptions come back as a short list, so nothing is guessed.

  3. Week 2: draft

    Draft report and calculation files. Your reviewer comments once, in one consolidated list.

  4. Week 3: final

    Final report, calculation files and the source register, issued under revision control.

Standards and methods

Work follows IEC 61511 for the process sector and IEC 61508 where device-level requirements apply. Probability calculations use the simplified equations of IEC 61508-6 and ISA-TR84.00.02, with imperfect proof testing, mission time, repair time and common cause failures modelled explicitly. LOPA follows the established CCPS approach.

Failure rates come from the device's own certificate or FMEDA, or from data you provide. Licensed reliability databases are used only under your own licence.

Qualification

TÜV Rheinland Functional Safety Engineer (SIS), with more than twelve years leading instrumentation and control at a world-scale petrochemical plant.

Questions

Who is responsible for the final functional safety decision?

You are, as owner or designer. Reports are prepared and signed as engineering work by a TÜV Rheinland Functional Safety Engineer. Independent functional safety assessment, where IEC 61511 requires it, stays with your assessment team.

What happens if our data is incomplete?

You get a gap list in the first week. Each missing value either gets an answer from you or a stated, conservative assumption that you approve before it is used.

Can you work with our existing calculation tool or template?

Yes. Results can be delivered in your template or tool format alongside the standard report.

Do you sign an NDA?

Yes, before any documents are shared.

Is everything remote?

Yes. Calculations, specifications and procedures are delivered online, and HAZOP and LOPA workshops run over video.

Send your function list and target SILs. A fixed-scope proposal follows within three working days.