Functional Safety · worked example, computed with First Out AI

A SIL 3 HIPPS where partial stroke testing closes the gap

Two valves and three transmitters look like plenty of redundancy, and the result lands in the SIL 3 band. Whether it delivers the risk reduction the LOPA asks for depends on the valves' common cause failures and on how often they are exercised.

Target
SIL 3, low demand
Method
LOPA, then SIL verification
Architecture
2oo3 sensors, 1oo2 valves
Result
PFDavg 4.6 × 10⁻⁴ with quarterly partial stroke

Scenario

A pipeline rated below the source pressure is protected by a high-integrity pressure protection system (HIPPS) instead of full-flow relief. If the upstream control valve fails open, pressure rises towards the source pressure.

Three transmitters voted two out of three close two shutdown valves in series, either of which isolates the pipeline.

SIL determination by LOPA

StepItemValueNote
Initiating eventUpstream pressure control valve fails open into a lower-rated pipeline0.2 /yrgeneric value for a control valve failing open; confirm with site history
Independent protection layerOperator response to an independent high-pressure alarmPFD 0.1
Conditional modifierProbability a person is within the hazard zone0.1
Mitigated event frequencywithout the SIF2.0 × 10⁻³ /yr
Tolerable frequencycompany criterion (illustrative)1.0 × 10⁻⁶ /yr
Required risk reductionPFDavg ≤ 5.0 × 10⁻⁴RRF 2,000SIL 3

Required risk reduction 2,000: SIL 3, PFDavg ≤ 5.0 × 10⁻⁴.

Architecture and input data

Each valve's coverage of 95 % assumes a full stroke with a tightness check, and a 10-year overhaul. A β of 10 % reflects two identical valves on the same line.

Pressure transmittersPT 1PT 2PT 32oo3, HFT 1Logic solverLogic 1oo1, HFT 1HIPPS valvesValve 1Valve 21oo2, HFT 1
2oo3 transmitters tolerate one fault; two valves in series act as 1oo2.
SubsystemVotingλDU /hλDD /hλS /hβProof testCoverageRenewal / overhaulPartial strokeTypeSCSFF
Pressure transmitters2oo31.5 × 10⁻⁷6.0 × 10⁻⁷3.0 × 10⁻⁷5%1 yr98%20 yr–BSC 385.7%
Logic solver1oo1, internal HFT 11.0 × 10⁻⁹5.0 × 10⁻⁷2.0 × 10⁻⁷–10 yr100%20 yr–BSC 399.9%
HIPPS valves1oo28.0 × 10⁻⁷05.0 × 10⁻⁷10%1 yr95%10 yr–ASC 338.5%

Function mission time (averaging horizon): 20 yr. Renewal / overhaul is when failures that no test reveals are cleared for each subsystem.

Verification without partial stroke testing

The valve group dominates. Its common cause term alone is about 5.1 × 10⁻⁴, more than the whole budget allows.

SubsystemPFDavgSharePFDavg, perfect test (IEC 61508-6)HFT achieved / requiredRoute 1H limitSpurious trips /h
Pressure transmitters4.8 × 10⁻⁵8%3.5 × 10⁻⁵1 / 1SIL 24.5 × 10⁻⁸
Logic solver4.8 × 10⁻⁵8%4.8 × 10⁻⁵1 / 1SIL 47.0 × 10⁻⁷
HIPPS valves5.3 × 10⁻⁴85%3.6 × 10⁻⁴1 / 1SIL 29.5 × 10⁻⁷
RequirementResultSupportsVerdict
Probability of failure on demandPFDavg 6.3 × 10⁻⁴SIL 3Pass
Hardware fault tolerance (IEC 61511)minimum HFT per subsystemSIL 3Pass
Systematic capabilitylowest element SC 3SIL 3Pass
Required PFDavg (from LOPA)≤ 5.0 × 10⁻⁴PFDavg 6.3 × 10⁻⁴Not met
Functiontarget SIL 3SIL 3SIL band met, required risk reduction not met
Spurious trip rate1.7 × 10⁻⁶ /hMTTFS 67.3 yrReported
PFD over the mission time, no partial stroke test
  • PFD(t) of the function
SIL 2SIL 3SIL 41 × 10⁻⁶1 × 10⁻⁵1 × 10⁻⁴1 × 10⁻³0.0105101520Years in servicePFD (log scale)PFDavg 6.3 × 10⁻⁴Required 5.0 × 10⁻⁴

Hover or tap the chart, or focus it and use the arrow keys, to read the value at any time.

Chart data
Years in servicePFD(t) of the function
05.80 × 10⁻⁶
15.69 × 10⁻⁵
21.08 × 10⁻⁴
39.15 × 10⁻⁴
49.71 × 10⁻⁴
52.38 × 10⁻⁴
62.90 × 10⁻⁴
71.11 × 10⁻³
81.17 × 10⁻³
94.22 × 10⁻⁴
102.69 × 10⁻⁵
118.27 × 10⁻⁴
128.83 × 10⁻⁴
131.56 × 10⁻⁴
142.07 × 10⁻⁴
151.02 × 10⁻³
161.08 × 10⁻³
171.14 × 10⁻³
183.91 × 10⁻⁴
194.44 × 10⁻⁴

Effect of partial stroke testing

Partial stroke assumed to reveal 60 % of the valves' dangerous undetected failures.

OptionFunction PFDavgValve group PFDavgBandAgainst required PFD
No partial stroke test6.3 × 10⁻⁴5.3 × 10⁻⁴SIL 3Short
Partial stroke every 6 months5.1 × 10⁻⁴4.2 × 10⁻⁴SIL 3Short
Partial stroke every 3 months4.6 × 10⁻⁴3.6 × 10⁻⁴SIL 3Meets
Partial stroke every month4.2 × 10⁻⁴3.3 × 10⁻⁴SIL 3Meets
PFD over the mission time, partial stroke every 3 months
  • PFD(t) of the function
SIL 3SIL 41 × 10⁻⁶1 × 10⁻⁵1 × 10⁻⁴1 × 10⁻³05101520Years in servicePFD (log scale)PFDavg 4.6 × 10⁻⁴Required 5.0 × 10⁻⁴

Hover or tap the chart, or focus it and use the arrow keys, to read the value at any time.

Chart data
Years in servicePFD(t) of the function
05.07 × 10⁻⁶
14.76 × 10⁻⁴
25.19 × 10⁻⁴
31.53 × 10⁻⁴
41.94 × 10⁻⁴
52.35 × 10⁻⁴
67.18 × 10⁻⁴
77.61 × 10⁻⁴
83.86 × 10⁻⁴
94.27 × 10⁻⁴
102.13 × 10⁻⁵
114.95 × 10⁻⁴
125.37 × 10⁻⁴
135.80 × 10⁻⁴
142.10 × 10⁻⁴
152.51 × 10⁻⁴
167.36 × 10⁻⁴
177.79 × 10⁻⁴
188.23 × 10⁻⁴
194.44 × 10⁻⁴

Findings

Redundancy does not help against failures that hit both valves at once. With identical valves, the common cause term sets a floor that no amount of testing of the independent failures removes.

Partial stroke testing every three months reveals most of those failures between proof tests and brings the function to 4.6 × 10⁻⁴. Monthly testing adds little more.

The transmitters and logic solver are not the issue: together they take a small share of the budget, and the 2oo3 voting keeps the spurious trip rate low.

Architecture: under IEC 61508-2 Route 1H, the pressure transmitters would support only SIL 2 and the HIPPS valves would support only SIL 2, because their safe failure fraction is low. The SIL 3 claim therefore rests on the IEC 61511-1 fault tolerance requirement (HFT 1 for SIL 3, met by the redundant groups) together with SC 3 certification or prior-use evidence for each device. That evidence has to be in the safety case.

Recommendations

  1. Install partial stroke testing on both valves at a three-month interval and record each result.
  2. Reduce the valve β: different actuator suppliers, separate solenoid power and separate instrument air supplies.
  3. Keep the tightness check in the annual proof test; partial stroke tests cannot replace it.

Worked example with an illustrative design and data, chosen to show the method; it is not a client project. Failure rates are typical of published device certificates and are not taken from any reliability database. Computed with the First Out AI engine v0.3.0 on 28.10.2026. First Out AI supports engineering judgement and does not replace it: results must be checked by a competent functional safety engineer, and First Out AI is not certified software. This is not engineering advice for a specific plant.